Home seekers in the housing market by Lisi, Gaetano
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Home seekers in the housing market
Gaetano Lisi
CreaM Economic Centre (University of Cassino)
26. February 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37065/
MPRA Paper No. 37065, posted 3. March 2012 19:02 UTC
  
 
Home seekers in the Housing Market 
 
Gaetano Lisi 
∗
 
 
 
Abstract 
There are two types of home seekers in this housing market matching model: the homeless 
who search for a dwelling both in the rental market and in the homeownership market 
simultaneously; and the home seekers in the renter (tenant) state who want to buy a home 
and only search in the homeownership market. The search process leads to several types of 
matching and in turn this implies different prices of equilibrium. Furthermore, the search 
process connects the rental market with the homeownership market. Hence, this simple 
model is able to explain both the relationship between the rental price and the selling price 
and the price dispersion which exists in the housing market, relying only on the different 
states of agents in the search process. 
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1. Introduction 
Although recent, housing market studies that adopt search and matching models are not 
new in the economic literature (notably, Wheaton, 1990; Krainer, 2001; Albrecht et al., 
2007; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Novy-Marx, 2009; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009; Diaz and Jerez, 
2009; Albrecht et al., 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung 
and Zhang, 2011). Precisely, two goals are usually pursued: analysing the formation process 
of house price and its dynamics; explaining the behaviour of the housing market, in 
particular the price dispersion and the relationship between prices, time-on-the-market and 
sales. 
All the papers in this literature formalise the important search and matching frictions 
which characterize the decentralized housing markets, but the key mechanism or insight 
behind the model is different: idiosyncratic shocks (Wheaton, 1990; Krainer, 2001; Albrecht 
et al., 2007; Diaz and Jerez, 2009), preference shocks (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009), 
mismatch between buyers and sellers (Caplin and Leahy, 2008), market tightness effect 
(Novy-Marx, 2009), thick-market effect on match-specific quality (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009), 
demand shocks (Genesove and Han, 2010), and auction (Albrecht et al., 2009). 
The empirical “anomaly” known as ‘price dispersion’ is probably the most important 
distinctive feature of housing markets. It refers to the phenomenon of selling two houses 
with very similar attributes and in near locations at the same time but at very different 
prices. The literature has mainly responded to the price dispersion puzzle by introducing the 
heterogeneity of economic agents. In Leung and Zhang (2011), in fact, a necessary condition 
for explaining the housing price dispersion (as well as other basic facts) is the heterogeneity 
on the seller's and/or the buyer's side, which generates corresponding submarkets.  
Nevertheless, price dispersion may arise from the very specific nature of the search 
process. In this model, there are in fact two types of home seekers: the homeless who 
search for a dwelling both in the rental market and in the homeownership market 
simultaneously; and the home seekers in the renter (tenant) state who want to buy a home 
and only search in the homeownership market. Hence, the search process leads to several 
types of matching; in turn, this implies different prices of equilibrium. Furthermore, the 
search process connects the rental market with the homeownership market. Indeed, as far 
as we are aware, the latter topic has been overlooked by housing market studies which 
adopt search and matching models. Indeed, papers in this literature omit from consideration 
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the rental housing market (Diaz and Jerez, 2009) or rely on the standard asset-market 
equilibrium condition (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009),
1
 thus assuming a rental market without 
frictions (Kashiwagi, 2011).
2
 
Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model of 
the housing market which is able to explain both the price dispersion and the relationship 
between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of agents in the search 
process. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing market 
matching model; section 3 shows the existence of price dispersion, while section 4 describes 
the relationship between selling price and rental price; finally, section 5 closes the model 
and section 6 concludes the work. 
 
2. The model 
The housing market consists of the rental market and the homeownership market. In the 
homeownership market, the home-seeker who finds a dwelling and pays the selling price 
( Sp ) becomes the (new) owner of the house; whereas, this does not happen in the rental 
market, where the rental price ( Rp ) only ensures the use of the house for a certain period of 
time. We distinguish these two markets by the subscript { }SR,i = , where R = rental market 
and S = homeownership market. A striking feature of the housing market is that today’s 
buyers/home-seekers are potential tomorrow’s sellers/landlords (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
2006). 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. the 
textbook by Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash 
bargaining. As regards the supply side, the expected values of posting a vacant house ( iV ) 
and of an occupied dwelling ( iD ) are the following:
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( ) [ ]RRRRR V-DθqcrV ⋅+−=                [1] 
                                                 
1
 Assuming perfectly competitive housing markets, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns for homeowners 
and landlords should be equated across investments. This yields the usual user cost formula à la Poterba (1984) 
where the rental price covers the user cost of housing, which is equal to the house price multiplied by the user 
cost, i.e. the sum of the real after-tax interest rate, the combined depreciation and maintenance rate, and the 
expected future house price appreciation. 
2
 Well-functioning rental markets can smooth out fluctuations in housing market liquidity (Krainer, 2001). 
3
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the exogenous 
interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
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[ ]RRRR DVδprD −⋅+=                               [2] 
( ) [ ]SsSSS V-pθqcrV ⋅+−=                             [3] 
where iθ  is the housing market tightness (see later), with { }SR,i = ; ci is the cost of posting 
vacancies; ( )iθq  is the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house, which depends 
on iθ ; and δ is the lease destruction rate. Instead, in the homeownership market, if a 
contract is legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the 
circumstances preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is 
set up. Hence, there is no destruction rate and the value of an occupied home is simple given 
by the selling price. 
As regards the demand side, there are two types of home-seekers in this model: i) 
the homeless who search for a house in both markets simultaneously; ii) the home-seekers 
in the renter (tenant) state who want to buy a home and only search in the homeownership 
market. The value function of the homeless (H ) is the following: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]HpxθgHTθgaerH SSRH −−⋅+−⋅+−−=              
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( )SR
SSRH
θgθgr
pxθgTθgae
H
++
−⋅+⋅+−−
=⇒                         [4] 
with ∂H/∂T>0, ∂H/∂ps<0, where T  is the value of being a tenant; He  is the effort (in 
monetary terms) made by the homeless to find and visit the largest possible number of 
houses; a is the cost of hotel accommodation; ( )iθg  is the (instantaneous) probability of 
finding a vacant house, which depends on iθ , with { }SR,i = ; and x is the buyer’s benefit (i.e. 
the value of the house). Instead, T  is modelled as a staging post for searching in the 
homeownership market: 
( ) [ ] [ ]THδTpxθgperT SSRT −⋅+−−⋅+−−=               
( ) [ ]
( ) δθgr
Hδpxθgpe
T
S
SSRT
++
⋅+−⋅+−−
=⇒                                   [5] 
with ∂T/∂H>0, ∂T/∂ps<0, ∂T/∂pR<0, and TH ee > , since the homeless search in both markets. 
A necessary condition for a non trivial equilibrium requires that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0θgθgδr
paee
HT
SR
RTH >
+++
−+−
=−  
which is true if ( ) RTH paee >+− , namely if the cost of being homeless is higher than the 
cost of being a tenant. 
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Market frictions in the rental and homeownership market are the following: 
h
v
θ RR =                             [6] 
th
v
θ SS +
=                             [7] 
with ( ) 0θq' i < , and ( ) 0θg' i > , i∀ , since iv  are the vacancies, t  are the tenants, and h  are 
the homeless.
4
 The “zero profit” equilibrium condition (i.e. 0Vi = , i∀ ) normally used by 
matching models gives the market tensions of equilibrium (see Pissarides, 2000).
5
 However, 
unlike the labour market matching model (which describes a negative relationship between 
market tightness and wage), in this case the free-entry condition yields a positive 
relationship between market tightness and price: 
( ) ( )δrc
p
θq
1
0V
R
R
R
R +⋅
=⇒=                                                   [8] 
( ) S
S
S
S
c
p
θq
1
0V =⇒=                                                 [9] 
This positive relationship is very intuitive: in fact, if the price increases, more vacancies will 
be on the market. We assume that market tensions are exogenous at the microeconomic 
level, in the sense that each individual takes Rθ  and Sθ  as given in the price bargaining. 
 
3. Search and matching process, price bargaining and price dispersion 
The generalised Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, allows the 
price to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus deriving from a successful 
match. The surplus is defined as the sum of the seller/landlord’s and home-seeker’s value 
when the trade takes place, net of the respective external options (the value of continuing to 
search). Hence, a trade takes place between the parties at a price determined by Nash 
bargaining if the surplus is positive. Precisely, the price (both rental and selling) solves the 
following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ homeseeker of gain netndlord seller/laof gain netargmaxprice −⋅=                               [10] 
where ( )1 0,γ ∈  is the bargaining power of the seller/landlord. 
                                                 
4
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: 
( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ iθi0θ θglimθqlim ii
, and ( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim iθi0θ ii == ∞→→ , i ∀ . 
5
 By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. ∞<< θ0 , since for 0=θ  the 
vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers immediately find a vacant house. 
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Hence, the bargained price crucially depends on the surplus deriving from the 
matching. Precisely, in this model three kinds of matching can occur, thus leading to 
different surpluses: 
i. The homeless find a home in the rental market. This matching produces a rental price 
of equilibrium: ( ) ( ){ }γ1γRRR HTVDargmaxp −−⋅−= ; 
ii. The homeless find a home in the homeownership market. This matching produces a 
selling price of equilibrium, ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSSAS HpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= ; 
iii. The home-seekers in the renter state find a home in the homeownership market. 
Hence, the selling price of equilibrium is ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSSBS TpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= . 
Therefore, the existence of price dispersion can be straightforwardly shown. In fact, 
in the homeownership market the net gain of home-seekers is different and this produces 
two different surpluses. Eventually, from equation [10] two different selling prices (
A
Sp  and 
B
Sp ) are obtained. It follows that the origin of price dispersion is due to the specific nature of 
the search and matching process. Indeed, this result holds true even in the presence of an 
identical bargaining power, identical search costs and also when the same house is 
considered. 
 
4. The relation between selling price and rental price 
As regards the selling prices, i.e. the matching (ii) and (iii) in the homeownership market, 
solving the optimisation conditions yields (recall that in equilibrium i 0,Vi ∀=  ): 
( ) ASAS p
γ
γ1
Hpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )HxγpAS −⋅=⇒  
( ) BSBS p
γ
γ1
Tpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )TxγpAS −⋅=⇒  
Given the properties of equations [4] and [5], both 
A
Sp  and 
B
Sp  depend positively on 
Rp ,  yet remaining different since HT ≠ . In fact, an increase in the rental price reduces both 
T  (directly) and H  (indirectly through T ). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can 
express this relationship in a broader form as follows:
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6
 Alternatively, one could see pS as a function of the two selling prices (pS
A
, pS
B
) and set up a system of four 
equations in four unknowns (pS, pS
A
, pS
B
, pR). However, this solution would add complexity but no further 
insight. 
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( )RSS ppp =                           [11] 
with 0p/p RS >∂∂ . Furthermore, if the rental price tends to zero, no one will have 
convenience to buy a house and the value of being a tenant will be at the maximum. As a 
result, the selling price will also tend to zero, since it cannot be negative or null. 
Instead, as regards the matching (i) in the rental market, we obtain: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )RR VD/γγ1HT −⋅−=−  
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) RRR
R
RR pcHT
γ1
θqδrγ
θqδr
cp
γ
γ1
HT =−−⋅
−
++⋅
⇒
++
+
⋅
−
=−⇒  
We know that an increase in selling price reduces both T  and H , since both home-seekers 
search in the homeownership market. Nevertheless, as long as the renter state is an 
appealing perspective, i.e. as long as ( ) δθg R > , the decrease in T  is stronger than the 
decrease in H . Indeed, buying a home is the only future perspective for a tenant. Hence, in 
this case we obtain a negative relationship between rental price and selling price: 
( )SRR ppp =                           [12] 
with 0p/p SR <∂∂ . Therefore, the relationship between selling and rental prices can be 
represented in the diagram with axes [ Sp , Rp ], where only a steady-state equilibrium exists 
in the housing market with positive prices (see Figure 1a). 
pS
pR
∂pS /∂pR >0
∂pR /∂pS <0
 
a) microeconomic (house prices) 
 
l.h.s.
r.h.s.
θ
i  
b) macroeconomic (housing market tightness) 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
Eventually, given 
*
Rp  and 
*
Sp , we get a unique value of tightness for each market (
*
Rθ  
and 
*
Sθ ) at the macroeconomic level. This testable proposition is made possible by a 
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downward sloping price function (in fact, ceteris paribus, 0θ/p RR <∂∂  and 0θ/p SS <∂∂ ), 
which forms the right hand side (r.h.s.) of the free-entry conditions (see equations [8]-[9] 
and Figure 1b). 
 
5. Closing the model with the homelessness equation 
In order to close the model, we normalise the home-seekers in the housing market to the 
unit: th1 += . In fact, the home-seekers in the renter state and the homeless who become 
homeowners exit the market (alternatively, one can assume that they become sellers or 
landlords). 
The evolution of homelessness in the course of time ( h& ) is thus the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]SR θgθghh1δh +⋅−−⋅=&                                    [13] 
( )h1δ −⋅  represents homelessness inflows, i.e. existing leases cancelled at rate δ , whereas 
( ) ( )[ ]SR θgθgh +⋅  describes the homelessness outflows, i.e. the homeless that find a home 
(as renter or as homeowner). Furthermore, the homelessness equation is independent of 
the transition rate which connects the renter (tenant) state to the homeowner state. 
Finally, in steady state equilibrium, where homelessness is constant over time 
( 0h =& ), it follows that: 
( ) ( )SR θgθgδ
δ
h
++
=                         [14] 
which has very intuitive properties: ∂h/δ>0, ∂h/∂g(θR)<0, and ∂h/∂g(θS)<0. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The literature has mainly responded to the price dispersion puzzle by introducing the 
heterogeneity of economic agents. Furthermore, the link between rental and 
homeownership markets has been overlooked by housing market studies which adopt 
search and matching models. This paper develops a search and matching model of the 
housing market which is able to explain both the price dispersion and the relationship 
between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of agents in the search 
and matching process. 
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